Decisional Bias as Implicit Moral Judgment by Spring, Toni & Saltzstein, Herbert D.
City University of New York (CUNY) 
CUNY Academic Works 
Publications and Research Queens College 
2017 
Decisional Bias as Implicit Moral Judgment 
Toni Spring 
CUNY Queens College 
Herbert D. Saltzstein 
CUNY Graduate Center 
How does access to this work benefit you? Let us know! 
More information about this work at: https://academicworks.cuny.edu/qc_pubs/432 
Discover additional works at: https://academicworks.cuny.edu 
This work is made publicly available by the City University of New York (CUNY). 
Contact: AcademicWorks@cuny.edu 
RUNNING HEAD: IMPLICIT MORAL JUDGMENT 
 
“This is an Accepted Manuscript of an article published in the International Journal of 
Developmental Science by IOS Press. Published on December 28, 2017. The final 
publication is available at IOS Press through http://dx.doi.org/ 10.3233/DEV-160192).” 
 
Decisional Bias as Implicit Moral Judgment 
 
Toni Spring 




Herbert D. Saltzstein 
Graduate Center, CUNY 
 
 
Address correspondence to 
Toni Spring, PhD. 
Adjunct Assistant professor/Department of Psychology 
Queens College, City University of New York 
toni.spring@qc.cuny.edu, (718) 997-5197. 
 
 




Decisional bias (false alarm rate) when judging the guilt/innocence of a suspect is offered as an 
implicit measure of moral judgment. Combining two data sets, 215 participants, ages 10-12, 13-
15, and 16-18 watched the visually identical film involving a person setting a fire, framed either 
as (a) intentional but not resulting in a fire (BI-NF), (b) unintentional but resulting in a major fire 
(NI-F), or (c) intentional and resulting in a major fire (BI-F).  After watching the film, 
participants identified seriatim who of six individuals was the perpetrator and how certain they 
were.  The data were subjected to a signal detection analysis.  Participants also explicitly judged 
“how bad” the perpetrator and act were. The implicit measure fit Piaget’s claim of moral 
realism, shifting from judging wrongness according to the outcome to judging according to the 
actor’s intentions, better than the explicit traditional measures.   
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Early in his career, Piaget (1965/1932) reported research on children’s moral judgments when 
playing games, such as marbles, and judging right and wrong about everyday transgressions. The 
best-known finding was that young children frequently ignore the actor’s intentions when 
making moral judgments, and instead judge primarily according to the material outcome of the 
act, a phenomenon Piaget termed moral realism. 
Subsequent studies of children’s attention to the intentions behind the act as distinguished 
from the outcome of the act when making moral judgments have not consistently supported 
Piaget’s claim of a developmental shift from attention to the outcome of the act to the intentions 
behind the act (e.g., Armsby, 1971; Boehm, 1962; Chandler, Greenspan, & Barenboim, 1993; 
Costanzo et al., 1973; Gutkin, 1972; Karniol, 1978; Rule & Duker, 1973). Furthermore, moral 
realism, as a developmental phenomenon, has largely disappeared from the research scene 
although it is central to the criminal justice system as mens rea or the state of mind of the 
accused whose job it is the juries to determine. In this report, we offer the possibility that 
eyewitness identification provides an alternative measure of moral judgment, which we believe 
better supports Piaget’s original claim, but at an implicit level of thinking. However, first some 
background is needed regarding the distinction between explicit and implicit decision-making 
and how it relates to this phenomenon and report. 
In recent years, there has been a general recognition that there are two ways of processing 
information, one deliberate, comprehensive and slow, termed explicit, and the other, intuitive, 
and fast but incomplete, termed implicit (e.g., Kahneman, 2003; Tversky & Kahneman, 1981). 
Although different modes of thinking have a long history in psychology, what is meant in recent 
literature by the terms is that one (implicit) is not deliberate but rather “impulsive” in the sense 
that it is not consciously thought out, whereas the other (explicit) is more subject to deliberation 
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and conscious awareness and planning. In addition to the research by Tversky and Kahneman, 
this dichotomy has given rise of much research in the areas of decision-making, as cited above, 
and even social and moral judgments (e.g., Eskine, Kacinik, & Prinz, 2011).  However, these 
studies have not been developmental either in theoretical focus or method whereas this study is 
decidedly developmental in both theory and method. 
Specifically, we believe that our previously published research on children’s eyewitness 
identification (e.g., Spring, Saltzstein, & Peach, 2012; Spring, Saltzstein, & Vidal, 2015) extends 
that effort in that it offers what we have come to believe is an implicit measure of moral 
intentionality, which rests on a Signal Detection (SD) analysis of eyewitness identification. In 
this research, our focus has been on decisional bias, the tendency to make false alarms, termed 
bias in signal detection analysis, rather than general accuracy. The underlying assumption of the 
research is that, in addition to relying on cognition and memory, the eyewitness is making a 
moral judgment in that a false alarm/positive risks sending an innocent person to jail whereas a 
miss/false negative risks letting a guilty person to go free, perhaps to commit another crime.   
This recognition, certainly common in the law and even in public discourse, has 
somehow eluded researchers in the area of eyewitness identification, who have for the most part 
focused on eyewitness identification as an exercise solely or primarily of memory and (general) 
cognition, although sometimes as subject to suggestibility, whereas we would argue that, in 
addition to those phenomena, it also involves an exercise of moral judgment but at an implicit 
level of functioning.  Our more specific hypothesis is that an implicit measure of moral judgment, 
in the form of decisional bias in eyewitness identification, of intended and unintended acts 
resulting in minor or major material damage, may conform to Piaget’s claim of moral realism 
even when the overt explicit moral judgments of the guilt of the person and act do not.  
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In this research, we have presented children and adolescents with the identical filmed 
event, which have been described or ‘framed’ as to the intentions of the actor and the 
consequences of the act (damage done) by means of a voice-over.  Note that the visual 
information remains identical across conditions whereas its moral meaning and significance is 
systematically varied by means of the different meanings conveyed by voice-overs. The voice-
over describes the act at the end of the film differently, as to the actor’s intention and the 
outcome of the act.  In this way, the same visual information can systematically have different 
moral meanings.  Then, the participants, either individually (for the younger children) or in small 
groups (the older children) make individual judgments identifying who is the perpetrator or perp. 
Our main interest and critical findings lie not in their accuracy (in Signal detection terms, 
sensitivity) but in their decisional bias, the relative balance of false positives and false negatives, 
corrected for chance. Thus, by comparing the patterns of findings re: age and condition 
(describing the actor’s intentions and the act’s outcome) for the two kinds of measures: one, the 
traditional explicit moral judgment and the other the new implicit decisional bias measure 
derived from the eyewitness identification we propose to see contrasting explicit and implicit 




Aggregated data from two previously published studies that included 215 participants 
who were recruited from a public elementary and junior high school in New York City and from 
private schools on Long Island and in Queens, NY, with the usual parental and child informed 
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consent. 1   The participant pool consisted of: 57 10-12-year-olds (M = 11.3), 93 13-15-year-olds, 
(M = 14.0), and 65 16-18 year olds (M = 16.5). 
Design and Stimulus Materials 
The film consists of four young men sitting around a table with cake resting on it with lit 
candles in the center, obviously celebrating one of their birthdays.  After a short time, a waiter 
comes over to tell them that they must immediately vacate the restaurant, thus cutting short their 
celebration.  One of them takes the cake with the lit candidates over to a trash can and throws it 
away.  The identical film was presented in all conditions.  What varied was the verbal (voice-
over) description of the later part of the film.  The first portion of the script is visually and 
aurally identical describing the event as a birthday celebration gone awry.  Then, the voice-over 
at the end of the film provides the critical variation in the meaning of the act.  
Throwing away the cake was described or framed by voice-over in three different ways: 
(a) as an unintended act, i.e., throwing away the cake just to dispose of it, but which results in a 
fire that ruined (‘burned down’)  the restaurant, i.e., as an unintended act which results in a fire 
causing major damage (NI-F), (b) as an intended act, angrily throwing away the cake in order to 
set a fire, but the fire fizzles out causing no damage (BI-NF), and (c) as a bad intended act, 
angrily throwing away the cake in order to start a fire, and which results in a fire that burned 
down  the restaurant (BI-F). The film lasted approximately 127 seconds.  Judging from their 
recital of the events immediately after seeing the film, it was very understandable even for the 
youngest participants.  
 
1 Data were also collected from 7-9 year olds, but in five separate studies, we have discovered from post-session 
interviews conducted after the eyewitness task completion that children in this age range do not think of the 
eyewitness identification task as involving a moral decision, i.e., as having consequences for others. Therefore, they 
do not differentiate between different moral settings of the event. 
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Participants were randomly assigned to one of the conditions. Immediately after viewing 
the film, the participants were asked to describe what happened to the restaurant (outcome), how 
bad was the man (man) and how bad was his act. Participants explicitly judged “how bad” for 
each of the following: the perpetrator, act and outcome as portrayed in the film along a 4-point 
scale. The participants were asked choose from a scale that included: not bad, a little bad, pretty 
bad, and very, very bad. After it was clear that the children understood the film and rated the act, 
actor and outcome, they began the eyewitness identification task.  
The participants were asked to identify seriatim who of six individuals was the 
perpetrator and how certain they were that he was the man who started (or tried to start) the fire 
along a four-point scale, from ‘very sure it was not the man’ to ‘a little sure it was not the man’ 
to ‘a little sure it was the man’ to ‘very sure it was the man’. There was a total of 54 judgments, 
which resulted from 6 individuals (the four individuals at the party, the waiter, who announces 
the closing of the restaurant, and a man not in the film at all) were each presented from 3 
perspectives (frontal, right and left profiles) = 18 photos, which were presented in three identical 
sequences, thus 18 x 3= 54 presentations.2  The sequences were random except that the same 
person never appears consecutively.  
These data were subjected to a signal detection analysis with a focus on the tendency to 
make false alarm or false positive judgments using criterion (C3), i.e., contrasting the alternative, 
very sure it is the man with the other three alternatives, corrected for chance. As noted, this 
 
2 The relatively large number of presentations was based on the advice we received from an expert in signal 
detection methodology that signal detection requires a large number of presentations in order to provide valid 
measures of decisional bias. We should add that although initially we were concerned about the number of 
judgments (identifications) required which we were afraid might be too much especially for the younger 
participants, we encountered no problems with even the youngest participants completing the task.  Their main 
concern was who was the man who did it? 
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criterion was chosen because past research (Pozzulo & Lindsay, 1999) has found that young 
children are particularly prone to very confidently identify the perp and because in past studies 
we have consistently found clearest results when using this criterion.   
The first study featured (a) bad intentions with neutral outcome, i.e., no fire (BI-NF) vs. 
(b) neutral (non-malevolent) intentions with bad outcome, i.e., a fire, he was just trying to get rid 
of the cake, with bad outcome, a fire that burned down the restaurant (NI-F); the second study 
featured (c) bad intentions, he was trying to start a fire because he was angry, with bad outcome, 
a serious fire that burned down the restaurant (BI-F) vs. (d) neutral intentions but with a bad 
outcome (also, NI-F). After establishing that the two research samples were comparable by 
demonstrating that there was no difference in the critical decisional bias scores (C3) for the 
common condition, where the fire was unintended (NI-F), we combined the data sets from both 
studies.  As noted, our primary measure of decisional bias rested on the divide between ‘very 
very sure’ and ‘sure’ ‘it is the man’, termed C3  
-----------Table 1 about here-------------------------------- 
Results 
Implicit Measure 
The aggregated data set shows a highly significant main and interaction effects between 
age group and condition on C3, the decisional criteria for being “very, very sure it was the man”, 
Levene’s Test indicated that the assumption of homogeneity of variance for ANOVA was 
satisfactorily met, F (8, 186) = 1.367, p = .214 (see Figure 1 and Table 1). There was a 
significant main effect for condition, F (2, 186) = 5.144, p < .01, partial eta squared = .052 and 
also a main effect for age group, F (2, 186) = 9.089, p < .001, partial eta squared = .089. More 
critically, there was a significant interaction between the age group of participants and condition, 
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F (4, 186) = 4.572, p < .01, partial eta squared = .09. For 10-12 year- old participants, C3 was 
significantly related to condition, F (2, 186) = 10.95, p < .001, partial eta squared = .105, but C3 
was not related to condition for 13-15 year olds F (2, 186) = 1.615, p = .202, partial eta 
squared=.017, or 16-18 year olds, F (2, 186) = .293, p = .747, partial eta squared=.003. Using the 
Tukey-Kramer adjustment to control for multiple mean comparisons, C3 for 10-12-year olds in 
the NI-F condition was significantly lower than in the BI-NF condition (p < .002) and marginally 
lower (p < .07) than in the BI-F condition. No other statistically significant differences were 
found in C3 between conditions within age groups. (Please note that a lower bias score indicates 
a higher rate of false positives/false alarms.) 
These scores, in general, support the conclusion that the children in the 10-12-year-old 
age group make more false alarms when there is a fire, even if unintended than if there is a bad 
intention but no fire. The difference between the unintended fire condition and the intended no 
fire condition is marginally significant. In general, this pattern partially supports Piaget’s claim 
of moral realism but at the implicit level for the 10-12-year olds.  
----------------- Figure 1 about here--------------- 
 
Explicit Measure 
We now turn to the traditional/explicit moral judgment measures (how bad was the act 
plus how bad was the actor). A Levene’s Test indicated that the assumption of homogeneity of 
variance for ANOVA was satisfactorily met, F (8, 206) = .854, p = .55). (see Figure 2). There 
was a significant main effect for age group, F (2, 206) = 5.255, p < .01, partial eta squared = 
.049, and for condition, F (2, 206) = 8.924, p < .001, partial eta squared = .08, and also a 
significant interaction between the age group of participants and condition (F (4, 206) = 2.756, p 
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< .05., partial eta squared = .051. The explicit moral judgment measure was significantly related 
to condition for the 13-15 year olds, F (2, 206) = 6.40, p = .002, partial eta squared = .058, and 
for the 16-18 year olds, F (2, 206) = 8.848, p < .001, partial eta squared = .079 such that moral 
judgments became more severe as intentions went from innocent to malevolent when there was a 
fire. There was not a significant difference between the conditions when there was (1) an 
unintended fire (NI-F) and a bad intention but no fire (BI-NF) or (2) between a bad intention but 
no fire and a bad intention resulting in a fire (BI-F). However, there was a significant difference 
unintended fire and a bad intention resulting in a fire. Thus, for the older children, moral 
condemnation came when there was a bad intended fire, not when there was just a bad intention. 
Thus, there is a clear general tendency, although not one reaching statistical significance, for 
blame to go up when there is a bad intention and further when there is a bad intention followed 
by a bad outcome. In contrast, participants ages 10-12, explicit moral judgments were not at all 
related to condition (F (2, 206) = 2.08, p = .127, partial eta squared = .02. 
--------------------- Figure 2 about here----------------------,  
Thus, the two older age groups seem to have partially used an explicit intentionality 
criterion when assigning moral blame in that they do differentiate between an intended fire (Bad 
Intention/Fire Condition) and an unintended fire (No Intention/Fire Condition) but not between 
an intended fire (Bad Intention/Fire Condition) and an intended fire that failed (Bad Intention/No 
Fire condition). In contrast, the youngest age group (10-12-year olds) do not appear to use either 
intentionality or outcome (material damage) in making explicit moral judgments. 
Discussion 
 What are we to conclude from this analysis of the aggregated data? The 10-12-year-old 
children exhibited more implicit ‘blame’, indicated by a lower bias score, i.e., relatively more 
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false alarms, when the outcome was bad, i.e., resulting in a fire, regardless of whether it was 
intended or unintended whereas the older participants (13-15 and 16-18-year olds) did not. In 
contrast, the explicit moral judgment measure does not fit with the developmental expectations 
formulated by Piaget and others. However, the explicit judgments do confirm the importance of 
intentionality and the relative unimportance of outcome/damage for the two older groups.  
          We can conclude that different kinds of moral judgments, explicit judgments of the moral 
act or the actor and implicit judgments of the decisional criteria for guilt, exhibit different effects 
of (patterns for) age, intentions and outcome on judgments. Note, however, that the implicit 
measure appears to fit better, although not perfectly, then the explicit moral judgment measure, 
with Piaget’s initial claim of moral realism at least at pre-adolescence. One possibility is that the 
adoption of intentionality as a criterion for moral judgments first occurs at the explicit level and 
only gradually is used at the implicit level.  In any case, we present this report to highlight what 
we believe to be a novel way of testing some long-standing claims about developmental changes 
in moral judgments with implicit measures of judgment, and of more general interest, that 
explicit and implicit measures yield somewhat different patterns of findings across age groups 
and conditions.  However, the main point to be noted is not whether Piaget’s claim of moral 
realism is or is not correct, but rather that explicit and implicit measures detect different 
developmental patterns of judgment. 
  Some readers may note a connection of our research and explanation to the work of Jon 
Haidt (2001) and others, as presented in Social Intuitionist Theory. However, we would 
emphasize that our approach is different in that it is decidedly developmental, not only in our 
choice of children and adolescents as social cognizers, but in our belief, that a developmental 
approach to phenomena of looking at fundamental change with age (as a marker of psychological 
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growth) offers the best strategy for understanding the nature of phenomena, here moral 
judgments, whether in their explicit or implicit form. 
The research also shows the connection between moral judgments and eyewitness 
identification, which rests on what we believe to be self-evident, that at least for eyewitnesses 
over the age of nine, an eyewitness identification involves not just memory and (nonsocial) 
cognition, but also a moral judgment. This, we believe, has important implications for 
researchers into both areas: children’s moral development and children’s eyewitness 
identification, and perhaps practitioners in the legal system. 
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Note: NIF indicates an unintended fire; BINF indicates a failed intention to start a fire, 
and BIF indicates a (bad) intended fire. 















Note: NIF indicates an unintended fire; BINF indicates a failed intention to start a fire, 
and BIF indicates a (bad) intended fire. 
Figure 2: Relationship between moral judgment and condition 
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Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics of Outcome Variables 
Outcome Variable NIF  BINF  BIF 
  N M SD   N M SD   N M SD 
Decisional Bias            
   Age 10-12 25 0.98 0.34  14 1.53 0.37  12 1.11 0.44 
   Age 13-15 45 1.34 0.33  16 1.36 0.38  23 1.19 0.44 
   Age 16-18 20 1.45 0.32  20 1.47 0.32  20 1.54 0.29 
Moral Judgment            
   Age 10-12 28 5.18 1.52  15 6.07 1.39  14 5.26 1.64 
   Age 13-15 47 4.62 1.47  16 5.31 1.01  30 5.77 1.46 
   Age 16-18 20 4.05 1.05  20 4.35 1.53  25 5.68 1.25 
Note. Decisional Bias measured by C3 “very sure it is the man”. Moral Judgment measured by 
“how bad was the man and how bad was what the man did”. NIF = an unintended fire. BINF = a 
failed intention to start a fire. BIF = a bad intended fire.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
